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Abstract 
We examine the impact of a “green network effect” in a market characterized by consumers’ 
environmental awareness and competition between firms in both environmental quality and product 
prices. The unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that an increase in the number of 
consumers of the green product increases the satisfaction of each green consumer. We show that this 
externality raises the consumption of the green product, reduces the environmental quality of products 
and improves welfare, even if it doesn’t affect the overall level of pollution. The externality correction 
requires using three optimal fiscal policies: an ad valorem tax on products, an emission tax, and a subsidy 
of the green purchase. A second-best optimum can also be reached through the green taxation. 
 
Keywords : consumer behavior, environmental quality, , network effect, vertical differentiation, taxation 
 
JEL classification : D11, D62, H21, L13, Q58 
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1. Introduction 
Green products make up an increasingly greater proportion of household 
expenditure. According to the most recent surveys by the European Commission (2008, 
2009), 83% of Europeans pay great attention to the impact of products on the 
environment when buying. 75% are “ready to buy environmentally friendly products 
even if they cost a little bit more”, compared to 31% in 2005. However, in 2008, only 
17% had recently bought “products marked with an environmental label”. In the United-
States, a recent survey shows that 82% of consumers continue to buy green, despite the 
battered economy, even if it costs more.
1
 
Green purchasing is primarily motivated by a certain degree of consumer ecological 
consciousness. This consciousness finds expression in concern about environmental 
problems and an intention to work for the improvement of the environment. Frey and 
Stutzer (2006) identify a number reasons behind “environmental motivation”: intrinsic 
motivations, altruism, internalized norms and social norms. Intrinsic motivations are 
based on individual tastes and ethical values. Altruism, the opposite of egoism, implies 
that the consumers of green products take into account the benefit that their 
consumption brings to other present and future members of the society, through the 
preservation or improvement of environmental quality. Internalized norms refers to 
individual morals: the culpability felt when polluting the planet by consuming polluting 
products and the warm glow felt due to green purchase. Social norms lead individuals to 
take into consideration the opinions of the other members of society when choosing a 
green product over another: if they think that their acquaintances approve of green 
product purchase and disapprove of standard product purchase, there are encouraged to 
buy green products. One American consumer out of five claims that word of mouth is a 
key factor in green purchase decisions. 
There is a link to the idea developed by Veblen (1899) and Leibenstein (1950), who 
emphasize that consumers are aware of the consumption choices of others. This 
awareness may be explained, for certain products, by consumer vanity or the snob 
effect, which is mainly characterized by the purchase of luxury goods and stems from 
the satisfaction arising from having an rare product, owned by few consumers. In the 
case of green products, consumers are more characterized by a certain conformity or 
bandwagon effect. The latter is defined by Leibenstein (1950) as follows: “By the 
bandwagon effect, we refer to the extent to which the demand for a commodity is 
increased due to the fact that others are also consuming the same commodity. It 
represents the desire of people to purchase a commodity in order to get into "the swim 
of things"; in order to conform with the people they wish to be associated with; in order 
to be fashionable or stylish; or, in order to appear to be "one of the boys."” In this 
situation, consumers are all the more satisfied with their purchases as many others are 
buying the same product. In this paper, we adopt the assumption of a spillover effect of 
the consumption of green products: the pleasure of consuming a green product increases 
with the number of consumer doing the same thing.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 Survey conducted in January 2009 by Green Seal and EnviroMedia and carried out on 1 000 consumers 
(www.greenseal.org/resources/green_buying_research.cfm (accessed 21/10/2009)). 
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Some constraints can however limit the purchase of green products, including 
economic reasons (high prices, budget constraints) and cognitive reasons (lack  of 
information about environmental problems, product features). The feeling that 
individual action can only play a minor role in the improvement of the environment 
leads some consumers to turn away from green products. Indeed, among the 85% of 
Europeans who claim to make an effort to protect the environment, more than half do 
not believe that their efforts have an impact as long as others and the major polluters 
(corporations and industry) do not do the same  (European Commission, 2005). These 
two reasons go a long way to explaining why 15% of Europeans rarely or never make 
effort for the environment. Once again, we encounter the idea that the lower the number 
of green consumers, the lower the individual motivation for such consumption. 
 A number of consumer surveys show a further feature of green products: most 
consumers perceive them as having a higher (environmental) quality than their 
competitors. Indeed, European Commission (2008, 2005) and the OECD (2002) studies 
emphasize that if they were sold at the same price as their more polluting counterparts, a 
large majority of consumers would turn towards green products. This assumption has 
been commonly assumed in the literature since Cremer and Thisse’s 1999 article.
2
 In 
the present paper, we also adopt this assumption of a market which is vertically 
differentiated for environmental reasons. 
The uniqueness of our model principally stems from the assumption of a network 
effect in a green market. This assumption is related to that adopted by Grilo et al. 
(2001). They formalize the effects of both consumer vanity and consumer conformity 
on product differentiation and competition between firms. Their analysis differs from 
that in the present paper in that it draws upon a horizontally differentiated model and 
does not deal with product environmental quality. Furthermore, conformity and vanity 
affect all the products in the market. They show two interesting results in the case of 
conformity: “when bandwagon effects are present but not too strong, both firms remain 
in business but price competition is fiercer and results in lower equilibrium price” and 
“when bandwagon effects are strong enough, different price equilibria may coexist in 
which either firm captures the whole market.” Lambertini and Orsini (2005) transcribe 
the vanity assumption into a market where products are vertically differentiated. They 
suppose that a positional product, whose quality is high, is in competition with a 
standard one, whose quality is lower. This study is comparable to the present one since 
the green product, with a higher quality, benefits from the externality in our model. We 
will see how our results differ to those of Lambertini and Orsini (2005), who show that 
product quality tends to decrease with the externality while welfare improves. Our 
analysis differs from these two models since it focuses on a green market and aims at 
providing insight for environmental policies. To our knowledge no previous analysis 
has been carried out on the network effect  in green markets. 
In this paper, we study the impact of the network effect not only on the price and 
quality strategy of firms, but also on the social optimum. We emphasize that the 
externality tends to lower the environmental quality of both products, but has no effect 
on product differentiation. It also encourages the consumption of green products. With 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
 See Amacher et al. (2004), Eriksson (2004), Conrad (2005), Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), Motta and 
Thisse (1999), Brécard (2008), Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero 
(2002), Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajac (2002) and Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003). 
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regard to the first-best optimum, a green market equilibrium leads to an excess of 
differentiation, a too low standard quality, a too low (high) green quality when the 
marginal environmental damage is high (low) and insufficient consumption of the green 
product. Nevertheless, using taxation, the regulator is able to move the market 
equilibrium towards the optimum. We show that the association of an ad valorem tax, a 
pollution tax and a subsidy for the green purchase can reconcile equilibrium and 
optimum. Our analysis of the second-best optimum shows that only green taxation 
achieves an improvement in social welfare. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the 
model. In section 3, we study the unregulated equilibrium and the impact of the network 
effect on equilibrium qualities and prices. In section 4, we examine the first-best 
optimum. In section 5, we introduce taxation and investigate the regulated equilibrium. 
Section 6 deals with optimal taxation. Section 7 is a conclusion. 
2. The model 
We assume that the environmental characteristics of a product do not affect the other 
characteristics of the product. A green product is thus viewed as of better quality than 
the standard product and is therefore more expensive. We further assume that the 
consumer of a green product is aware of the number of people purchasing the product. 
As in the models of vertical product differentiation developed by Mussa and Rosen 
(1978) and Cremer and Thisse (1999), each firm produces one variant of a product and 
decides on its price. Each consumer only gains satisfaction from the consumption of the 
first unit of the product and buys one unit of the product or none.  
Consumer preferences are represented by the following utility function ui "( ): 
ui "( ) = "qi # pi +$ ini i = l,h  (1) 
with ! an ecological consciousness parameter which is uniformly distributed over "," [ ] 
with a unit density function (" = " #1),  !qi willingness-to-pay for quality qi , pi the 
price of product i, and ni the number of consumers buying the product i. We assume that 
the network effect only works for the green product with quality qh (qh " ql), so that 
"h # 0  and " l = 0. In order to simplify notations, we define " #"h . 
Faced with a “green” quality qh and a “brown” quality ql ( ), only consumers 
with a parameter 
" #
˜ 
" = pl ql  purchase. The consumer 
ˆ 
" = ph # pl #$" ( ) qh # ql #$( )  
is indifferent between buying the brown product ql at price pl or the green product qh at 
price ph. Through concern for simplicity, we assume that the market is covered and thus 
that ˜ " # " .3 Accordingly, the demand functions are defined by: dh = " # ˆ "  and 
dl = ˆ " #" , with nh " dh . 
The firms’ marginal production cost are assumed, in line with Cremer and Thisse 
(1994, 1999), to be independent of quantity, strictly increasing and convex in quality, 
with the quadratic form c qi( ) = 12 cqi2. The ecological quality of the product i is defined 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
 The analytical results of this model are hugely more difficult to provide and to analyse when we assume 
that the market is not covered. Without tax and with a cost parameter c equal to one, Motta (1993) only 
succeeds in giving a numerical solution of the game. 
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by abatement qi = e " ei, where e  is the maximal pollution by each firm and ei pollution 
by firm i. Quality is defined over the interval 0,e [ ] . We also assume, following Cremer 
and Thisse (1999), Amacher et al. (2004), Eriksson (2004), Conrad (2005) and 
Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), that abatement is achieved through a variable production 
cost, so that firms’ profits are defined by: 
" i = pi # c qi( )( )di i = h,l  (2) 
The competition between firms takes place in a two-stage game. In the first stage, the 
environmental quality, qi, to produce is decided on. In the second stage, prices, pi, are 
chosen 
The economy is here characterized by three market failures: imperfect competition, a 
network effect and pollution. The issue of behavior optimality is thus particularly 
relevant. In order to analyze this question, we define welfare as the sum of the 
consumers’ surpluses and the firms’ profits less the environmental damage: 
W = CSh qh,ql( ) + CSl qh,ql( ) + "h qh,ql( ) + " l qh,ql( ) #D E( ) (3) 
The surplus of consumers of a product i is defined, as usual, by 
CSi qh,ql( ) = "qi # pi( )df "( )ˆ 
" i
" i
$
, with ˆ " l = " #1, " l = ˆ " h = ˆ "  and " h = " . The 
environmental damage is the monetary equivalent of the consequences of polluting 
emissions for the whole of society. It is defined in a linear function of overall emissions 
E: D E( ) = "E , with " # 0  and E " ehdh + eldl . The regulator role consists in guiding the 
economic actors towards optimal behavior, i.e. behavior which maximizes the social 
welfare. The introduction of corrective fiscal policies in the fifth section of the paper 
will lead us to add State revenue to the welfare components.  
In the following section, we examine the game equilibrium in the case of laissez-
faire. 
3. The unregulated equilibrium 
The game is solved using backward induction in order to provide the sub-game 
perfect equilibrium. 4  
In the second stage, firms compete on price knowing the product qualities decided on 
in the first stage. Maximization of profit (2) with respect to price induces the following 
reaction functions: 
ph =
1
2
pl + 2 qh " ql( )# + cqh
2
4
pl =
1
2
ph + 2 qh " ql( ) 1"# ( ) + cql24 "
$
2
 (4) 
We find here the standard property of increasing reaction functions.  
 
We deduce from (4) the equilibrium prices of the sub-game: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 The demonstrations are given in appendix A1. 
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ph =
1
3
qh " ql( ) # +1( ) " $3 +
1
3
cqh
2 +
1
6
cql
2
pl =
1
3
qh " ql( ) 2 "# ( ) " 2$3 +
1
3
cql
2 +
1
6
cqh
2
 (5) 
In the first stage, firms decide on quality levels by maximizing their profits (2) and 
anticipating prices (5) of the second stage. We show in appendix A1 that, when 
condition (C1), c" # 9 16 , is fulfilled, the only equilibrium of the quality sub-game is 
the following: 
qh
*
=
12" + 3# 8c$ 2" +1( )
4c 3# 4c$( )
ql
*
=
12" #15 #16c$ " #1( )
4c 3# 4c$( )
 (6) 
The associated equilibrium prices are then: 
ph
*
=
16" 2 + 8" + 25
32c
#$
64c 2$ 2 # 6c$ 8" +15( ) + 9 4" + 3( )
12 3# 4c$( )2  (7) 
pl
*
=
16" 2 # 40" + 49
32c
#$
128c 2$ 2 # 6c$ 8" + 27( ) + 9 4" + 5( )
12 3# 4c$( )2  
The demand for the green product is defined by: 
nh
*
=1 2 + 2c"( ) 9 #12c"( )  (8) 
The firms’ profits are then: 
 
"h (qh*,ql*) = 3 2c #$( )nh*2
" l (qh*,ql*) = 3 2c #$( ) 1# nh*( )2 (9) 
The size of the network effect, ", tends to deteriorate the quality of both products in 
the same degree.
5
 The product differentiation is hence not affected by this externality 
(qh
*
" ql
*
= 3 2c ). The intensity of price competition remains the same, but prices 
decrease because of the lower product quality.
6
 Finally, without a network effect, firms 
share the demand equitably. The network effect favors the green product firm, which 
sees its market share increase with " ("nh
*
"# = 2c 4c# $ 3( )2 ) and corners the whole 
market when 
" = 9 16c .7 As a result, the network effect acts favorably on the profit of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
 "qi
*
"# = $ 3 3$ 4c#( )2  
6
 We deduce, from equation (5), the following equalities: 
"pl
"#
= $
2
3
+
c
3
qh
"qh
"#
+
2c
3
ql
"ql
"#
% 0  and 
"ph
"#
= $
1
3
+
2c
3
qh
"qh
"#
+
c
3
ql
"ql
"#
% 0  
7
 We show in the appendix that, whatever the extent of the network effect may be ( 0 "# " 9 /16c ), the 
market is fully covered if 
" # 9 4 . 
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the green firm.
8
 By contrast, the brown product firm is penalized by the externality, 
which reduces the number of its customers.
9
 
When the products are sold at price (7) with equilibrium qualities (6), welfare, 
defined by the equation (3), is written: 
W * =
" " #1( )
2c
+
9
32c 3# 4c$( )2 +$
9 # 8c$
18 3# 4c$( ) +
% 2" #1( )
2c
#%e  (10) 
Welfare rises with the green network effect.
10
 In the following section, we compare the 
unregulated equilibrium with the first-best optimum. 
4. The first-best optimum 
The first-best optimum is reached when, for each product, the marginal benefit of 
consumption is equal to the marginal social cost of production, and also when the 
allocation of consumers between both qualities is optimal (see Cremer and Thisse, 
1999, Lombardini-Riipinen,, 2005 and Lambertini et Orsini, 2005). The three green 
market failures (imperfect competition, a network effect and pollution) lead us to give 
new definitions for the product prices and for the environmental consciousness 
parameter for the consumer indifferent between both products, compared to those used 
for the equilibrium.  
The optimal product prices correspond here to the marginal production cost minus 
the marginal environmental damage, plus, for the green product, the marginal benefit of 
the network effect. Hence, the “fair prices” are the following (see appendix A2): 
ph
o
=
c
2
qh
o2 + " e # qh
o( ) #$ nho
pl
o
=
c
2
ql
o2 + " e # ql
o( )
 (11) 
The welfare function is then defined by: 
W = "ql # pl
o[ ]d"
" #1
ˆ 
" °
$
+ "qh # ph
o[ ]d"
ˆ 
" °
" 
$
 (12) 
with ˆ " ° =
ph
o
# pl
o
#$" 
qh # ql #$
 (13) 
The optimal qualities of the green and brown products are solutions of both first order 
conditions "W "qh = 0  and "W "ql = 0  detailed in appendix A2.  The only solution 
for this system of equations that satisfies the second order conditions and the stability 
condition is the following: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8
 "#h "$ = 9% 8c$( ) %32c 2$ 2 + 36c$ + 9( ) 3% 4c$( )3 & 0 for c" # 0,9 16[ ]  
9
 "# l "$ = 9% 8c$( ) %64c 2$ 2 +108c$ % 63( ) 3% 4c$( )3 & 0  for c" # 0,9 16[ ]  
10
 We verify that, when condition (C1) is fulfilled, 
"W *
"#
=
243$ 504c# + 576c 2# 2 $ 256c 3# 3
36 3$ 4c#( )3 % 0  
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qh
O
=
4" + 4# $1$ 32c% " + #( )
4c 1$ 8c%( )
ql
O
=
4" + 4# $ 3$ 32c% " + # $1 2( )
4c 1$ 8c%( )
 (14) 
This solution is valid when the green network effect is relatively low: the condition, 
denoted (C2), c" #1 16 , which is more restrictive than condition (C1). 
At the optimum, the differentiation is lower than at the unregulated equilibrium 
(qh
o
" ql
o
=1 2c ). This is explained by the behavior of the firms that want to raise product 
differentiation in order to relax price competition. Differentiation remains at the 
optimum independent of the extent of the network effect. The equilibrium green quality 
is too low (high) when the marginal damage, #, is higher (lower) than a given 
threshold
11
, whereas the standard quality is always too low. In addition, the optimal 
allocation of consumers corresponds to a demand for the green product higher than that 
at equilibrium: 
ˆ 
" 
o
= " #
1
2
#
4c$
1# 8c$
%
ˆ 
" = " #
1
2
#
2c$
3 3# 4c$( )  (15) 
This difference in demand arises from the network effect alone. Thus the network effect 
benefits the green firm, to the expense of the brown firm, at the equilibrium. 
Welfare at the first-best optimum is therefore defined by: 
W o =
16" " #1( ) # 32c$ 2" #1( )2 + 5
32c 1# 8c$( ) +
% 2" #1+ %( )
2c
#%e  (16) 
Welfare tends to grow with the network effect.12 The following equation shows that, 
unsurprisingly, first-best optimal welfare is higher than welfare at the equilibrium: 
W * "W o = "1+ 4d
2
8c
"
c# 2 256c 2# 2 " 512c# + 285( )
18 3" 4c#( )2 1" 8c#( ) $ 0 (17) 
The unregulated equilibrium is suboptimal whatever the extent of the network effect 
may be.
13
 This difference is due, in particular, to an overall optimal pollution higher 
than that at the game equilibrium: 
E o = e " 2# "1
2c
"
$
c
% E * = e " 2# "1
2c
 (18) 
The three market failures lead firms to non-optimal behavior. Only corrective 
policies are able to motivate them to change their supply strategy in the desired 
direction. Accordingly, in the following section, we introduce policies likely to play this 
role. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 This threshold is defined by: ˜ " =
1
2
+
10c#
2 3$ 4c#( ) 1$ 8c#( )  
12
 
"W o
"#
=
1
4 1$ 8c#( )2 % 0 
13
 The polynomial function of degree two of equation (16) has no real root and remains positive whatever 
the values of c and "  . 
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5. The regulated equilibrium 
We envisage three fiscal policies: a pollution tax in order to limit excessive 
environmental damage, an ad valorem tax in order to reduce product differentiation, and 
a subsidy for the green product in order to favor the network externality. Doing this, we 
draw on a framework close to the one proposed by Lombardini-Riipinen (2005). 
However, the introduction of the green network effect means a corrective policy 
including three instruments rather than two. 
With consumers of the green product benefiting from the subsidy, s, the utility 
function is modified in the following way: 
ui "( ) = "qi # pi +$ ini + si i = l,h  (19) 
with 
"v #" $ 0, sv " s # 0  and " l = sl = 0. The subsidy
14
 tends to increase ex ante the 
demand for the green product, by moving consumer who is indifferent between the 
green and standard product towards the left, over the interval " #1," [ ] . This is 
characterized by the parameter ˆ " = ph # pl #$" # s( ) qh # ql #$( ).  
The firms are subject to an emission tax and a product tax. Their profits are thus 
rewritten as follows: 
" i = 1# tv( )pi # c qi( ) # $ e e # qi( )( )di
=
1
$ v
pi # $ v c qi( ) # $ v$ e e # qi( )( )di i = h,l (20) 
with tv the ad valorem tax defined over 0,1[ ], " v =1 1# tv( )  an index of the ad valorem 
tax defined over 1,+"[ ), and " e  the pollution tax defined over 0,+"[ ). 
The second game stage, price competition, consists of firms maximizing their profits 
(20), knowing the chosen qualities at the first stage of the game qh
**
,ql
**( ). We show in 
appendix A3 that the equilibrium prices of the subgame are here characterized by: 
ph
**
=
1
3
qh
**
" ql
**( ) # +1( ) + $ e$ v3 3e " 2qh** " ql**( ) +
s"%
3
+
1
3
$ vcqh
**2 +
1
6
$ vcql
**2
pl
**
=
1
3
qh
**
" ql
**( ) 2 "# ( ) + $ e$ v3 3e " qh** " 2ql**( ) "
s + 2%
3
+
1
3
$ vcql
**2 +
1
6
$ vcqh
**2
 (21) 
The first game stage, quality competition, leads firms to maximize their profits (20) 
knowing the prices (21). As in the unregulated game, there exists a unique quality 
equilibrium. The equilibrium qualities are the following: 
qh
**
=
12" + 3# 8$ vc% 2" +1( )
4$ vc 3# 4$ vc%( ) #
2s
3# 4$ vc%
+
$ e
c
ql
**
=
12" #15 #16$ vc% " #1( )
4$ vc 3# 4$ vc%( ) #
2s
3# 4$ vc%
+
$ e
c
 (22) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 The subsidy s is here different from the one assumed by Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), who weights the 
subsidy by the gap between both qualities qh " ql( ) . 
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The environmental tax motivates firms to enhance the quality of their products, 
whereas the subsidy encourages them to reduce quality. Notwithstanding this, neither of 
them affects product differentiation (qh
**
" ql
**
= 3 2# vc( )). This is only influenced by the 
ad valorem tax, which, as noted it Cremer and Thisse (1994), tends to decrease 
differentiation. This effect brings about a reduction of the ecological quality and a lower 
deterioration, or an improvement, of the standard quality.
15
  
The demand for the green product is given as: 
nh
**
=
1
2
+
" vc 2s+#( )
3 3$ 4" vc#( )  (23) 
It is stimulated by the subsidy for green purchases and the ad valorem tax16 but is not 
affected by the environmental tax. The standard firm enjoys a positive demand since the 
condition, " vc s+ 2#( ) $ 9 8 , denoted (C3), is fulfilled. 
The firms’ profits are defined by: 
 
"h (qh**,ql*) = 3 2# v2c $% # v( )nh**2
" l (qh**,ql**) = 3 2# v2c $% # v( ) 1$ nh**( )2
  (24) 
The profits at the regulated equilibrium are independent of the level of the pollution tax, 
which affect qualities and prices of both firms in the same way. The ad valorem tax 
reduces the profits.
17
 The subsidy increases the profits of the green firm to the detriment 
of its competitor. 
How can the taxes and subsidy induce an optimal behavior in firms? We deal, in the 
following section, with the possibilities of reaching the first best optimum using 
appropriate taxation and with the existence of an environmental taxation able to attain a 
second best optimum. 
6. Optimal taxation 
Only implementation of the three fiscal instruments can motivate firms to supply the 
optimal qualities at “fair prices” to consumers while stimulating demand for the green 
product to its optimal level. When the regulator is only responsible for environmental 
policies, he cannot guide the economy towards the first best optimum. Therefore, we 
investigate how an environmental tax and/or a subsidy for green purchase can lead to a 
second best optimum. We ignore the ad valorem tax because it has the propensity to 
increase pollution and, hence, is not suitable for an environmental policy (see 
Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005 and Brécard, 2008). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 "qh
**
"# v = $% c# v
2
$ 9+ 8c# v 3$ 4c# v & + s( )( )[ ] 4c# v2 3$ 4c# v&( )2[ ] ' 0 and  
"ql
**
"# v = "qh
**
"# v + 3 2c# v
2( ) $ "qh** "# v  
16
 "nh
**
"# v = 2c 2s+$( ) 4c$ % 3( )2  
17
 
"#h
"$ v
= %
3%$ vc&
c$ v
3 nh
2
%
4c 3% 2$ vc&( ) 2s+&( )
3c$ v
2 3% 4$ vc&( ) nh ' 0 , and 
"# l
"$ v
= %
3%$ vc&
2c$ v
2 +
2c& 9% 4$ vc&( ) 2s+&( )
3$ v 3% 4$ vc&( )2
' 
( 
) 
) 
* 
+ 
, 
, 
1% nh( ) - 0  
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The first best optimal taxation has to equalize the equilibrium values of qualities, 
prices and demand, and their optimal values. Consequently, we attempt to find one or 
more solutions " v
o
," e
o
,so( ) to the system of three equations qh** = qho , ql** = qlo  and 
nh
**
= nh
o .  The single optimal taxation is defined in the following way: 
" v
o
," e
o
,so( ) = 3, # + 23 $ %
1
2
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
+ 
,
, 5 %16c,( )
2 1% 8c,( )
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
+ 
 (25) 
The ad valorem tax and the environmental tax are the same as those given by 
Lombardini-Riipinen (2005). This result is not surprising insofar as the network effect 
of the consumption of the green product affects neither the product differentiation nor 
the pollution at the equilibrium. The ad valorem tax is equal to 2/3 while the 
environmental tax is higher than the marginal damage, #, in order to correct the harmful 
effect of the product tax on pollution levels. The optimal subsidy is null if the spillover 
doesn’t come into play and positive when (C2) is fulfilled; the greater the spillover 
effect, the greater the optimal subsidy
18
 in order to stimulate the demand for the green 
product. 
If the regulator only has one or two tax instruments, he aims to achieve a second best 
optimum characterized by maximal welfare when prices and qualities are those chosen 
by the firms at the regulated equilibrium. The welfare is thus defined by: 
W ** = CSh
** + CSl
** + "h
** + " l
** +GR** #$E **  (26) 
with GR** = " eE
**
# snh
**  the government revenue coming from the environmental tax 
paid by the firms (redistributed to consumers as a lump sum) from which the subsidy 
paid to consumers of green product is deducted (financed by a lump sum tax paid by the 
whole consumer base) 
At the regulated game equilibrium, the pollution tax has no impact on product 
differentiation, firms’ market share or profits. Nevertheless, it raises the prices of the 
products and increases the qualities firms supply to consumers. Without other corrective 
policies, the welfare is defined by: 
W
" e
**
=W * + " e
2# $ " e
2c
 (27) 
We deduce from equation (27) that the second order environmental tax ˆ 
" e is here equal 
to the pigouvian tax #. This result is the same as that of Lombardini-Riipinen (2005) 
because the network effect has no effect on pollution and thus on the policy that aims at 
reducing it. Furthermore, because of the assumption of full market coverage, the tax 
does not induce any reduction in the firms’ supply. 
The green purchase subsidy favors the green firm to the detriment of the brown firm. 
The monetary transfer from the whole of the consumer base, through an individual 
lump-sum tax snh
**, to the consumers of the green product (who are each given a 
subsidy of s) allows the following welfare to be achieved: 
Ws
**
=W * + 2c s
" 21#16c"( ) + s 3+ 8c"( )
9 2 # 4c"( )2  (28) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 "so "# = 128c 2# 2 $ 32c# + 5( ) 2 1$ 8c#( )2 % 0 
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Under condition (C1), the subsidy tends to improve welfare beyond that achieved 
without the environmental policy. Consequently, the green purchase aid must be 
maximal. The highest optimal subsidy is the one that leads to the disappearance of the 
brown product. It arises from the equality nh
**
=1 and is defined by ˆ s = 9 "16c#( ) 8c .  
The joint use of the two fiscal instruments achieves an increase in welfare to the 
threshold Ws+" e
**
= 2# + 2$ %1( )2 8c( ) +& %$e . When the network effect fulfills 
condition (C2), welfare remains lower than that reached at the first best optimum. We 
indeed show that Ws+" e
**
=W o # 1#16c$( )2 32c 1# 8c$( )( ) . In a monopoly situation, the 
green firm
19
 supplies the quality ˆ qh = 2" + 2# $1( ) 2c  at price 
ˆ p h = 4" 
2
# 4" +13# 4$ 2( ) 8c( ) #% + $e  and earns a profit ˆ " h = 3 2c #$ .  
The combination of the pollution tax and the green purchase subsidy is however 
likely to be subject to budget constraints. In this case, the subsidy arises from the 
following equality ˆ ˆ s nh = " e E = # e $ qhnh $ ql 1$ nh( )( )  in which the qualities and the 
demand depend on the subsidy level. It is defined by 
ˆ 
ˆ s = "9 + 8c# + 9 " 8c#( )2 + 96$ 3" 4c#( ) 1+ 2ce " 2$ " 2% ( )& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
+ 16c( ). This subsidy is 
lower than the maximal one, ˆ s , when the network effect is not too 
high (" # 9 + 4$ 2% + 2$ & 2ce &1( )[ ] 16c( )). The equilibrium qualities are therefore 
lower and the green consumers are fewer. Welfare is also lower than with the maximal 
subsidy. 
The combination of the Pigouvian tax and the maximal subsidy of green purchase 
allows an improvement in welfare and moves the economy towards an second best 
optimum. 
7. Conclusion 
The taking into account the effect that the number of consumers of a green product 
has on their satisfaction on consuming that product has given new results about the 
working of a green market. 
Firm behavior is not only influenced by consumer willingness to pay for ecological 
quality, as shown by Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), but also by the green network effect. 
This effect pushes firms to decrease both the quality of their products and their prices, 
although the product differentiation is not impacted by the externality. It benefits the 
green firm, which sees its market share and its profit rise to the detriment of its 
competitor. Moreover, it results in an improvement in welfare, although it doesn’t affect 
total pollution. 
The network externality cannot however alone compensate for the effects of 
pollution and imperfect competition on welfare. It doesn’t change the tendency of firms 
to over-differentiate their products and to over-pollute in comparison with the first-best 
optimum. Nevertheless, the spillover effect is at the origin of an inefficiency in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 The green firm is here in a situation of a monopoly threatened by the entry of the brown firm and can’t 
apply its monopoly strategy. 
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green product demand. The implementation of an appropriate taxation system allows 
the reconciliation of the equilibrium to the optimum. We have shown that the optimal 
combination of an ad valorem tax, a pollution tax and a subsidy for green purchase can 
achieve this. When the regulator only has environmental policy tools, the optimal policy 
consists in imposing a pigouvian tax, equal to the marginal damage, and a subsidy for 
the green purchase that eventually removes the standard product firm from the market. 
This paper completes the analysis initiated by Cremer and Thisse (1999) and drawn 
out by Lombardini-Riipinen (2005). It takes advantage of recent literature dealing with 
the effects of the number of consumers of a product on the satisfaction arising from its 
consumption (Grilo et al., 2001, Lambertini and Orsini, 2005). Even if our model has 
the merit of being relatively simple, it would undoubtedly gain from being generalized 
to the case of partially covered market. The network effect could then play on the total 
production and, in this way, on the total pollution. This would certainly modify the 
optimal taxation, in particular the pollution tax. 
Appendix 
A1. Unregulated equilibrium 
Price competition results in the maximization of profits (2), when the varieties chosen in the previous 
stage are known. The following are the resulting reaction functions : 
ph
* pl( ) = 12 pl + 2 qh " ql( )# +
cqh
2
4
pl
* ph( ) = 12 ph + 2 qh " ql( ) 1"# ( ) + cql
2
4
"
$
2
% 
& 
' 
' 
( 
' 
' 
 (A1) 
The only candidate for the equilibrium of this subgame,  ph
*
= ph
* pl
*( ) and pl* = pl* ph*( )  is written: 
ph
*
=
1
3
qh " ql( ) # +1( ) " $3 + 13 cqh2 + 16 cql2
pl
*
=
1
3
qh " ql( ) 2"# ( ) " 2$3 + 13 cql2 + 16 cqh2
 (A2) 
We deduce from (A2) the demand for both firms: 
nh =
2 qh " ql( ) 1+# ( ) " 2$ " cqh2 + cql2
6 qh " ql "$( )
nl = 1" nh
 (A3) 
The profits (2) are then rewritten: 
"h (qh ,ql ) = qh # ql #$( )nh2
" l (qh ,ql ) = qh # ql #$( ) 1# nh( )2
 (A4) 
Quality competition finds expression in the qualities maximizing (A4). The first order conditions 
(FOC) are written: 
"#h qh ,ql( )
"qh
=
nh
6 qh $ ql $%( ) 4cqh ql +%( ) + 2 qh $ ql( ) & +1( ) $ cql
2
$ 3cqh
2
$ 2% 1+ 2& ( )[ ] = 0
"# l qh ,ql( )
"ql
=
1$ nh( )
6 qh $ ql $%( ) 4cql $qh +%( ) + 2 qh $ ql( ) & $ 2( ) + cqh
2 + 3cql
2
$ 4% & $1( )[ ] = 0
 (A5) 
Both firms remain in the market since 0 < nh < 1. The FOC thus reduces to the following two-equation 
system: 
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4cqh ql +"( ) + 2 qh # ql( ) $ +1( ) # cql2 # 3cqh2 # 2" 1+ 2$ ( ) = 0
4cql #qh +"( ) + 2 qh # ql( ) $ # 2( ) + cqh2 + 3cql2 # 4" $ #1( ) = 0
% 
& 
' 
( 
' 
 (A6) 
This system of two polynomial functions of degree two in qh and ql has five candidates for the 
equilibrium qh
*
,ql
*( ) :  
(i) 
2 " +1( ) # 9# 8c$
2c
,
2" #1
2c
% 
& 
' 
' 
(
)
*
*
 (ii) 
2" #1
2c
,
2 " # 2( ) + 9#16c$
2c
% 
& 
' 
' 
(
)
*
*
 
(iii) 
2" #1
2c
,
2 " # 2( ) # 9#16c$
2c
% 
& 
' 
' 
(
)
*
*
 (iv) 
2 " +1( ) + 9# 8c$
2c
,
2" #1
2c
% 
& 
' 
' 
(
)
*
*
  (A7) 
(v) 
3+12" # 8c$ 1+ 2" ( )
4c 3# 4c$( ) ,
#15+12" #16c$ " #1( )
4c 3# 4c$( )
% 
& 
' 
' 
( 
) 
* 
* 
 
Without the network effect, solution (i) and (ii) result in absence of differentiation. In this case, the profits 
of both firms are null and the second order conditions (SOC) are fulfilled ( "
2
# i "qi
2
= $c 3). These 
solutions can’t be Nash equilibria insofar as solution (v) allows both firms to earn positive profits. 
Solutions (iii) and (iv) don’t satisfy the SOC. Only solution (v) is a game equilibrium: profits are positive 
( " i = 3 8c ) and the SOC are fulfilled ( "
2
# i "qi
2
= $c 4 ). With " # 0 , the SOC are written: 
"
2
#h qh ,ql( )
"qh
2
qh
*
,q l
*
=
c 9$ 8c%( ) $32c 2% 2 + 64c% $ 27( )
36 3$ 4c%( )2 3$ 2c%( ) & 0 if c% & 0.6047
"
2
# l qh ,ql( )
"ql
2
qh
*
,q l
*
=
c 9$16c%( ) $32c 2% 2 + 56c% $ 27( )
36 3$ 4c%( )2 3$ 2c%( ) & 0 if c% & 9 /16 = 0.5625
 (A8) 
Finally, the condition for market coverage ( ˜ " #" $1) implies: 
1024c 3" 3 +192c 2" 2 4# 2 $ 8# $11( ) $144c" 8# 2 $16# $ 9( ) $ 27 16# 2 $ 32# $ 9( )
24 3$ 4c"( ) 4 3$ 4c"( )# +16c" $15( ) % 0  (A9) 
 
When the condition 0 " c# " 9 /16 is satisfied, the denominator is positive if " # 15$16c%
4 3$ 4c%( ) . Without the 
network effect, the coverage condition is simply written 4" +1( ) 4" # 9( ) 4" # 5( ) $ 0 . It is fulfilled if 
" # 9 4 . In the case of a network effect, the graph below shows that the numerator is always positive 
under this last condition. 
 
Fig.1. Numerator of the condition (A9) 
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A2. First-order optimum 
We consider, as Cremer and Thisse (1999) and Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), that product prices 
correspond to the marginal social costs of these products. Equations (12) and (13) lead to the following 
expression for welfare at the first-best optimum: 
W =
ph " pl "# qh " ql( )( )
2 qh " ql "$( )2
"2% qh " ql( ) qh " ql "$( ) " qh " ql " 2$( ) ph " pl( )[
                                       + cqh
2 + cql
2( ) qh + ql "$( ) "# qh " ql( ) qh " ql( ) " ql qh " ql "$( )]
+
qh " ql "$( )
2 qh " ql "$( )2
# +1( )ql + cql2 " 2% e " ql( )( ) qh " ql "$( ) "$# ql + ql ph " pl( )[ ]
 (A10) 
Let pl
o
 be the optimal price of the standard product, the price of the green product maximizing the 
welfare defined by (A10) is the solution of: 
ph
o
= pl
o +
c
2
qh
2
" ql
2( ) "# qh " ql( ) +$ qh " ql( ) c qh + ql( ) " 2% " 2#( )2 qh " ql " 2$( )  (A11) 
with pl
o
=
1
2
cql
2 +" e # ql
o( ) . We deduce that: 
 ph
o
=
c
2
qh
2 +" e # qh( ) +$ qh # ql( ) c qh + ql( ) # 2% # 2"( )2 qh # ql # 2$( )  (A12) 
The number of consumers of green products is then defined by: 
nh
o
=
qh " ql( ) c qh + ql( ) " 2# " 2$( )
2 qh " ql " 2%( )  (A13) 
The optimal price of the green product is thus simply defined by: 
ph
o
=
c
2
qh
2 +" e # qh( ) +$ nho (A14) 
By substituting the optimal prices in the welfare function (A10), we obtain: 
W =
qh " ql( )2 c qh + ql( ) " 2#( ) c qh + ql( ) " 2# " 4$ ( ) + 4$ 2[ ]
8 qh " ql " 2%( ) "# e +#ql "
1
2
ql cql " 2$ +1( )  (A15) 
The maximization conditions for welfare are the following: 
"W
"qh
=
1
8 qh # ql # 2$( )2
qh # ql( ) c qh + ql( ) # 2% # 2&( )[
#2 & +% ( ) qh # ql # 4$( ) # c 3qh2 + ql2 # 4qhql # 8$qh( )( )' 
( 
) 
= 0
 (A16a) 
"W
"ql
=
1
8 qh # ql # 2$( )2
c 2 qh # 3ql( ) qh + ql( ) qh # ql( )2% 
& 
' 
+ 8c 2$ql qh + ql( ) qh # ql( )
+8cql ( #1+)( ) qh # ql( )2 # 8c$ qh + 3ql( ) qh # ql( ) ) +( ( )
+32c$ql qh # ql #$( ) +16$ 2 2( + 2) #1( )
+16$ qh # ql( ) ( #1+)( )2 # 4 ( #1+)( )2 qh # ql( )2* 
+ 
, 
= 0
 (A16b) 
The system has only one solution satisfying the SOC and the stability condition. We can show that 
when the optimal qualities are defined by (14), the following second derivatives are definitely negative if 
c" < 1 16: 
"
2W "qh
2
qh
O
,q l
O = #c 3# 48c$ +128c
2
$
2( ) 8 1# 8c$( )2 1# 4c$( ) < 0  (A17a) 
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"
2W "ql
2
= #c 1#16c$( ) 3# 32c$ +128c 2$ 2( ) 8 1# 8c$( )2 1# 4c$( ) < 0  (A17b) 
The cross second derivatives are positive: 
 "
2W "qh"ql qho ,q lo
= "
2W "ql"qh qho ,q lo
= c 1#16c$( ) 8 1# 8c$( )2 1# 4c$( )   (A18) 
and the determinant of the hessian matrix H is positive: 
 Det H = c 2 1"16c#( ) 8 1" 8c#( ) 1" 4c#( ) (A19) 
A3. Regulated equilibrium 
At the price competition stage, the reaction functions resulting from maximization of profits (20) are 
written: 
ph
* pl( ) = 12 pl + s + qh " ql( )# +$ e$ v e " qh( )[ ] +
$ v
4
cqh
2
pl
* ph( ) = 12 ph " s + qh " ql( ) 1"# ( ) +$ e$ v e " ql( ) "%[ ] $ v4 cql2
& 
' 
( 
) 
( 
( 
 (A20) 
Only one candidate for the equilibrium, whose definition is given in the equation (21), results from (A20). 
The demand for products and the profits are then defined as functions of the qualities and parameters of 
the model: 
nh =
2 qh " ql( ) 1+# e# v +$ ( ) + 2s" 2% "# vcqh2 +# vcql2
6 qh " ql "%( )
nl = 1" nh
 (A21) 
"h (qh ,ql ) =
qh # ql #$
% v
nh
2
" l (qh ,ql ) =
qh # ql #$
% v
1# nh( )2
 (A22) 
At the quality competition stage, maximization of the profits (A22) leads to the following first order 
conditions: 
"#h qh ,ql( )
"qh
=
nh
6$ v qh % ql %&( ) 4$ vcqh ql +&( ) + 2 qh % ql( ) ' +1+$ v$ e( )[
%$ vcql
2
% 3$ vcqh
2 + 2 s+& + 2$ v$ e& + 2&' ( )] = 0
 (A23a) 
"# l qh ,ql( )
"ql
=
1$ nh( )
6% v qh $ ql $&( ) 4% vcql $qh +&( ) + 2 qh $ ql( ) ' $ 2+% v% e( )[
+3% vcql
2 +% vcqh
2
$ 2s$ 4& ' $1+% v% e( )] = 0
 (A23b) 
As for the unregulated equilibrium, the equation system has five candidates for the equilibrium. We keep 
only the solution qh
**
,ql
**( ) , which, without a network effect or taxation, corresponds to the Nash 
equilibrium: 
12" + 3+# e# v( ) $ 8c# v 2%" + s+%( )
4c# v 3$ 4c# v%( ) ,
12" $15+# e# v( ) $ 8c# v 2%" + s$ 2%( )
4c# v 3$ 4c# v%( )
& 
' 
( 
( 
) 
* 
+ 
+ 
 (A24) 
The second derivatives of the profits are written: 
"
2
#h qh ,ql( )
"qh
2
qh
*
,q l
*
=
c 9+ 8c$ v s%&( )( ) %32c 2$ v2& 2 + 8c$ v s+ 8&( ) % 27( )
36 3% 4c$ v&( )2 3% 2c$ v&( )
' 0
"
2
# l qh ,ql( )
"ql
2
qh
*
,q l
*
=
c 9% 8c$ v s+ 2&( )( ) %32c 2$ v2& 2 % 8c$ v s% 7&( ) % 27( )
36 3% 4c&( )2 3% 2c&( ) ' 0
 (A25) 
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The determinant of the hessian matrix is then defined by: 
Det H =
c 9+ 8" vc s#$( )( ) 9# 8" vc s+ 2$( )( )
162 3# 2" vc$( ) 3# 4" vc$( )  (A26) 
with 
"
2
#h
"qh"ql
=
"
2
# l
"ql"qh
=
c 9+ 8$ vc s%&( )( ) 9% 8$ vc s+ 2&( )( )
36 3% 2$ vc&( ) 3% 4$ vc&( )2
 (A26) 
The second derivatives are negative if, without taxation, " < 9 16c  and, in the case of corrective taxation, 
" v# < 9 16c  and " #
8$ 10+ 8% vcs
8% vc
. The determinant of the hessian matrix is positive under the 
previous conditions and the condition s " 9 8# vc( ) $ 2% .  
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